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The Effects of the Condemnation of 1277
JASON GOOCH
Department of Philosophy
Western Michigan University

T

here are three primary stances regarding the relationship between science and the church in the
middle ages. Concerning the condemnation of 1277, Pierre Duhem argues that (A) 1277 marks
“the birth of modern science.”1 Edward Grant and Richard Dales, among others, argue that (B)
1277 led to an “intellectual climate.”2 Conversely, a wide-ranging group of scholars beginning in the
seventeenth century (including Condorcet, and Voltaire) have endorsed a “warfare thesis,” claiming that
(C) the church is responsible for the “dismal state of medieval science.”3 I shall argue that A, B and C all
prove to be inadequate. In the tradition of Locke and Hume, the criterion by which the arguments are
adjudicated shall be the evidence found in primary sources. After all, “A wise man…proportions his
belief to the evidence.” 4 In the spirit of Duhem’s original thesis, I shall narrow the focus to the effects of
the condemnation of 1277 in Paris.
In a recent article, David C. Lindberg points out a lapse in the historiography of medieval science
concerning the role of the church. He writes, “…the response of professional historians of medieval
science has been curiously muted. We all acknowledge (when pressed) that there was a Christian context,
and we deal with it when we must, but in general the community of historians of medieval science has,
since Duhem, steered a course away from religious issues.”5 In response to Lindberg, the goal of this
paper is not only to refute A, B and C, but also to offer a fair appraisal of the relationship between science
and the church in regards to 1277. While one may argue that Edward Grant has stripped Duhem’s thesis
of its implausibility, thus nullifying any controversies that may exist amongst scholars, I shall argue that
Grants thesis is thus rendered innocuous. Further, I shall argue that Grant’s thesis largely ignores the
negative effects of 1277, while C fails to account for legitimate contributions made by the church to the
progress of medieval science. Thus, in response to Lindberg’s remarks, I will: 1) render the arguments
presented by Duhem, Grant, and White inadequate, and 2) present a new thesis, claiming that the effects
of 1277 were narrow and largely ignored.
I. Against the Duhemean Position
While Lindberg’s remarks may seem like an over generalization, and he admits as much, one
would indeed be hard pressed to find a work more thorough and complete regarding the relationship
between science and the church in the middle ages than Duhem’s Etudes sur Leonard de Vinci. Thus, one
might reasonably question how exactly Lindberg’s concerns amount to a problem. Further, one might
1

Duhem, Pierre. Etudes sur Leonard de Vinci, 3 vols. (Paris: Hermann, 1906-1913), Vol. I, p. 412.
Dales, Richard C. “Medieval De-Animation of the Heavens” Journal of the History of Ideas Vol. 41, No. 4 Oct,
1980, pg. 547
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Lindberg, David C. “Medieval Science and Its Religious Context” Osiris 2nd Series, Vol. 10, Constructing
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point out, as Hans Thijssen has done, that few current scholars seriously endorse Duhem’s thesis (noting
that Edward Grant perhaps comes closest).6 However, Duhem’s thesis is not only bold, but it is
unjustified given the evidence. Moreover, it has yet to be adequately refuted and replaced by a more
cogent thesis.
In the historiography of medieval science, Pierre Duhem’s work was seminal, legitimizing
medieval science as a “serious academic discipline.”7 Grant refers to Duhem as the “eminent historian of
medieval science.”8 Writing on the condemnation of 1277, Duhem presents the following claim:
…They impressed on scholastic science, in France as well as in England, a new orientation that
obliged it to deviate from the Aristotelian tradition at many points…If we must assign a date to
the birth of modern science, we would without doubt choose this year 1277…9
While Duhem’s influence may be fading as medieval works continue to be translated and become more
widely available, the debate is far from over. In response to the “warfare” thesis, which was reasserted in
Bertrand Russell’s Religion and Science (1935), Christian apologists such as Stanely Jaki have rushed to
Duhem’s defense.10 The debates have generally been decided by personal opinion, each side pushing an
agenda. Opinion, however, should carry little weight in the history of the philosophy of science.
Accordingly, it is the purpose of section one to refute Duhem’s central claim by using a defined set of
criteria.
If Duhem’s claim that 1277 ought to mark the birth of modern science is correct, then a series of
questions arise. First, what is modern science? Second, what separates it from pre 1277 science? And
finally, why 1277? It seems that if 1277 does in fact mark the birth of modern science, then one could
reasonably expect to find several occurrences in the years immediately following 1277:
1) Widespread effects, resulting in
2) Change in scholarly thought (perhaps, a fortiori, leading to the rejection of Aristotelianism), and
3) Signs of significant advances and progress.
After all, the birth of modern science ought to be marked by notable advances in thought and
methodology. For the date to mark the birth of modern science effects must have been both significant
and widespread. Otherwise, Duhem would clearly not regard it as such a monumental date. Further, the
changes must result in marked differences, thus the “birth” of modern science. However, we instead find
quite the opposite. Though not arguing against Duhem, Dales elucidates the point by writing:
…These condemnations were limited to Paris in their application although they seem to have
exerted some influence on English thought as well. Secondly, condemning a view is not the same
as abolishing that view. And finally, and most important, no European thinker to my knowledge

6

Thijssen, Hans “Condemnation of 1277” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2003. Pg 6 of 8.
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Grant, Edward. A Source Book in Medieval Science. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1974, Pg. 46.
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Pierre Duhem, Etudes sur Leonard de Vinci, 3 vols. (Paris: Hermann, 1906-1913), Vol. I, p. 412. Reprinted in
Lindberg, David C. “Medieval Science and Its Religious Context” Osiris, 2nd Series, Vol. 10, Constructing
Knowledge in the History of Science (1995), pg. 68.
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had yet proposed the kind of cosmos in which the motions of the heavenly bodies could be
accounted for adequately as being natural.11
If these criticisms can be supported, then they would certainly prove devastating to Duhem’s claim.
In order to reject the first claim that would be expected if Duhem’s thesis were indeed correct, we
need to look no further than the actual writings of the bishop of Paris, Etienne Tempier. On the 18th of
January 1277 Pope John XXI wrote to Tempier requesting that he investigate rumors of heresy. Six weeks
later, on the 7th of March, Tempier published his list of 219 condemned propositions. However, on the
28th of April 1277 the Pope wrote a follow up letter to Tempier, the “Flumen aquae vivae.” But, as
Thijssen points out, “this letter gives no indication whatsoever that the pope knew about Tempier’s
action.”12 It may very well be that Tempier acted autonomously. Further, Tempier’s personal
characteristics must be taken into account. John Wippel characterizes Tempier by pointing out that he
“was not noted for his moderation,” and that the Papal Curia was “reputed to be more merciful.”13
Thijssen describes Tempier’s actions as “overzealous and hasty.”14 Given such evidence, it should begin
to seem plausible that any effects that 1277 may have caused were more isolated than Duhem would have
us believe. Further, the condemnation ought not to reflect the attitude of the church as a whole but rather,
the over zealous disposition and intolerance of a single bishop in but one city. Accordingly, it is difficult
to imagine that the condemnation launched the birth of modern science.
Moreover, 1277 was not the first condemnation in Paris. The works of Aristotle were first banned
in 1210 and again in 1215, but as early as the 1240’s the works of Aristotle were a regular part of
university curriculum.15 Thus, the banishment of Aristotelian thought was, at least in Paris,
commonplace. It is hard to take seriously decrees that are frequently ignored and rarely enforced. Why
does Duhem insist that 1277 mark the birth of modern science and not 1210 or 1215? Would it not be
reasonable for a scholar of the time to believe that Aristotelian thought would resurface and that the
decrees would once again pass without serious implications on scientific thought? Taken in a broader
scope, there were approximately fifty cases of academic related judicial proceedings in the thirteenth and
fourteenth centuries.16 While prima facie this appears to be a staggering figure, it amounts to no more
than one such case every four years. Moreover, the effects were not centralized and thus magnified, but
were rather spread across the whole of Western Europe.
Even more convincing is that one would expect to find a significant change of thought in the
years following 1277, but it is less than clear that this is indeed the case. Largely focused on Aristotelian
natural philosophy, the condemnation was a response by the bishop to rumors of heresy.17 The works of
Aristotle, recently translated from Greek to Latin, had become entrenched in medieval thought in the
years prior to 1277. However, such works often indirectly implying that God’s powers are limited, were
11

Dales, pg 546.
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Thijssen, pg. 2 of 8.
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Wippel, pg. 172.
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Courtenay, William J. “Inquiry and Inquisition: Academic Freedom in Medieval Universities” Church History
Vol. 58, No. 2 (Jun., 1989), pg. 170.
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arts faculty in Paris for disseminating Aristotelian views.
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viewed as heretical by the church. Among the 219 condemned propositions, proposition forty-nine is of
particular importance. It reads, “That God could not move the heavens with rectilinear motion; and the
reason is that a vacuum would remain.”18 Undoubtedly, this is aimed at Aristotle’s argument, which held
that a void was impossible. Duhem argues that the denial of this argument ultimately “liberated Christian
thought from the dogmatic acceptance of Aristotelianism.”19 And prima facie, this seems plausible.
However, even when God’s absolute powers where acknowledged, the acknowledgment did not
always coincide with the refutation of Aristotle. While Nicole Oresme held that God could create multiple
worlds in a void if he so pleased,20 he “concurred with Aristotle that there is only one world which
contains all the matter in existence.”21 Referring to proposition forty-nine, Thomas Bradwardine writes,
“…by means of His absolute power God could make a void anywhere He wishes inside or outside of the
world.”22 At best, such statements appear to be little more than mere concessions rather than
wholehearted endorsements.
John Buridan perhaps comes closest to seriously challenging an Aristotelian view. Proposition
one hundred ten reads: “That the celestial motions occur because of an intellective soul; but an intellective
soul or intellect cannot be produced except by means of a body.” In response, Buridan concludes:
…Someone might imagine that it would not be necessary to posit intelligences to move the
heavenly bodies, because Scripture does not say anywhere that they ought to be posited. For it
could be said that when God created the celestial spheres, He began to move each one of them as
He wished. And they are still moved by the impetus He gave them, because this impetus is
neither corrupted nor diminished, since it has no resistance.23
However, there is no clear evidence that Buridan rejected Aristotle’s theory of motion in the heavens. In
fact, Dales points out that Buridan “seems to accept Aristotle’s doctrines of heavenly movement without
any qualification.”24 And so, given significant evidence found in the primary sources of the time, it is
difficult to conclude that the condemned propositions were responsible for the birth of modern science.
Further, university masters were adamant about preserving their teaching freedoms. The
acceptance of theological limits did not come without debate and protest, nor were they always followed.
Albertus Magnus (ca. 1193-1280), bishop of Regensburg, is said to have traveled to Paris in order to
defend his views against the condemnation of 1277.25 Speaking of Henry of Hesse, Dales writes, “For him
the condemnation of 1277 might as well never have taken place in spite of the fact that he himself taught
in Paris.”26 Speaking of Godfrey of Fontaines, Mary M. McLaughlin writes, “Far from moderate in his
own opposition to the decree of 1277, Godfrey upheld the right of the theologian not only to seek out, in
free discussion, the truth about the articles themselves, but to decide what authority pertained to the
18

Grant, Edward. A Source Book in Medieval Science. Pg. 48.
Thijssen, pg. 6 of 8.
20
Proposition thirty-four reads: “That the first cause could not make several worlds.”
21
Grant, Edward. “Medieval and Seventeenth-Century Conceptions of an Infinite Void Space beyond the Cosmos”
Isis Vol. 60, No. 1 (Spring, 1969), pg. 49.
22
Bradwardine, Thomas. De causa Dei, pg. 180.
23
Buridan, John. Quaestiones super libris quattuor De caleo et mundo, ed. Ernest A. Moody (Cambridge, Mass.,
1942; repr. New York, 1970) Bk. II, Question 12.
24
Dales, pg. 548.
25
Grant, A Source Book in Medieval Science. Pgs. 809-10.
26
Dales, pg. 549.
19

The Hilltop Review: A Journal of Western Michigan Graduate Research
http://www.wmich.edy/gsac/hilltop

This article © Jason Gooch
All Rights Reserved

Condemnation of 1277

38

bishop in these matters.”27 Protecting one’s right to teach freely and pursue the truth was of the utmost
concern. William of Ockham staunchly defends his freedom: “Assertions especially concerning natural
philosophy, which do not pertain to theology, should not be solemnly condemned or forbidden by
anyone…everyone should be free to say freely whatever he pleases.”28 Even when the limits were
accepted and supported, the relevant issues were nonetheless often discussed. In fact, “Since the
beginning of universities, propositions that sounded heretical had been viewed as perfect training tools to
test the dialectical skills of young theologians to find an orthodox truth beneath a seemingly false or
heretical statement.”29 Instead of abandoning or ignoring Aristotelian views, the views were frequently
assimilated. Though the list of condemned propositions may seem like censorship to the modern mind,
this was not necessarily the view of the time. Lindberg points this out by writing, “In fact, medieval
natural philosophers had remarkable freedom of thought and expression…All medieval scholars knew
that there were theological limits, and knew approximately where they were, but these undoubtedly
seemed broad and reasonable rather than narrow and restrictive.”30 If anything, it seems as though the
condemnations merely clarified the status quo for those that bothered to listen.
Though we find indirect references to the list of 219 propositions in the writings of Oresme,
Bradwardine and Buridan, among others, they cannot simply be construed as church inspired progress. In
fact, there is little evidence of any progress over the Aristotelian world-view. In spite of the so-called
“intellectual climate” sparked by 1277, even Grant concedes “By the midthirteenth century…Aristotle’s
cosmology was solidly entrenched in the medieval universities, where it remained virtually unchallenged
until the sixteenth century.”31 It was not until Tycho Brahe’s observation of a super-nova in 1572 and of
a comet in 1577 that the incorruptibility of the heavens could finally be put to rest, and it was not until
Galileo that Aristotle’s system was fully refuted.
However, even in Galileo’s Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems, written
approximately 350 years after the condemnation, the church’s influence remains evident. Galileo’s
mouthpiece, Salviati, says, “I did not say, nor dare I, that it was impossible for nature or for God to confer
immediately that velocity which you speak of.”32 Though this seems to be a concession to the pope, it is
obvious that Galileo’s rejection of Aristoteliansism was not based on theological grounds but rather, on
rigorous argumentation. In fact, later in the text, Galileo demonstrates that the omnipotence of God could
be used to argue in favor of an anti-Copernican view. This time the speaker is Simplico, the simpleminded defender of Aristotle: “But with respect to the power of the Mover, which is infinite, it is just as
easy to move the universe as the earth, or for that matter a straw. And when the power is infinite, why

27
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Freedom” Church History Vol. 24, No. 3 (Sep., 1955), pg. 203.
28
William of Ockham, Dialouge, I. ii. 22 (ed., M Goldcast, Moncrchia s. Romani Imperiii sive Tractatus de
Jurisdictione Imperiali, regi, et Pontificia, 3 vols., Frankfurth, 1668, II).
29
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30
Lindberg pg. 76
31
Grant, Edward. “Were there Significant Differences between Medieval and Early Modern Scholastic Natural
Philosophy? The Case for Cosmology” Nous Vol. 18, No. 1, 1984 A.P.A. Western Division Meetings (Mar.,
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should not a greater part of it be exercised rather than a small?”33 That is, God could just as easily move
the sphere of fixed stars around the earth as He could move the earth itself.
There are several obvious objections to this line of reasoning in defense of Duhem. First, one may
object to the notion that one ought to reasonably expect significant progress because of the condemnation.
After all, the concepts that would ultimately overthrow Aristotle were often not evident in everyday
experience. It is perhaps unreasonable to expect radical progress in a short period of time and without
advances in technology such as the telescope. Further, there is evidence that the effects of the
condemnation were indeed widespread. There are dozens of references in the writings of major figures
from Buridan to Oresme (which ought to be proof enough), and there is evidence that their effects were
felt as far away as Oxford (and as late as Galileo). Thijssen points out, “The collection of Parisian Articles
must have had some kind of official status, and must have circulated among medieval scholars. Bachelors
in theology were required by oath not to maintain anything in favor of articles that have been condemned
at the Roman curia or in Paris.”34 Moreover, Christian apologists such as Stanley Jaki have objected to
the warfare thesis. Jaki writes, “The decree of 1277 was a jolt…The jolt was to keep one mentally on
one’s toes in an anxious awareness of the inconceivably numerous ways in which the Creator could go
about his work.”35
To these objections I cannot hope to offer a thorough and conclusive defense. Short of a booklength manuscript examining each individual case, it is difficult to arrive at absolute truths. Nonetheless,
it seems reasonable to derive at least one generalization from the evidence at hand: the effects of 1277 are
often exaggerated, particularly by Duhem. And thus, the conclusion of section one may appear to be a
weak one: that it cannot be justifiably held that 1277 marks the birth of modern science.36 This though, I
believe to be sufficient for our purposes. And other scholars would support the claim. Though using a
different line of reasoning, Alexandre Koyre, for one, completely rejects Duhem’s claim, instead arguing
that Galileo marks the birth of modern science.37 This, however, does little more than to pit one authority
against another. Arguments holding that the effects of 1277 were in fact widespread must be addressed.
If, as alluded to earlier, one ought not to reasonably expect significant progress as a result of the
condemnation, then 1277 becomes an arbitrary date and should not be considered the birth of modern
science. Given such criterion, the works of Copernicus and Galileo were certainly more revolutionary and
could thus more aptly be labeled as the birth of modern science. Additionally, that the Parisian Articles
carried some sort of official status ought not to come as a surprise nor carry any weight. The authority of
the church is not questioned here or by any credible scholar. Rather, the issue is whether or not major
figures such as Buridan and Oresme seriously considered the decrees in their works and whether or not
their works were in turn taken seriously by later scholars. Can it reasonably be concluded that the
collection of such works constituted the birth of a new science? Finally, that the effects of 1277 were also
felt in Oxford hardly constitutes a widespread influence. The list of English scholars who referenced 1277
33
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in their writings (directly or indirectly) is virtually nonexistent. While Paris, Rome, and Oxford would
certainly be listed amongst the major cities and universities of the time, the list is hardly inclusive.
II. Grant and Dales Refuted
Without directly disputing or endorsing Duhem’s thesis, Edward Grant presents his own thesis:
It is no exaggeration to say that the medieval Scholastics who accepted and argued for the reality
of an imaginary infinite void space beyond the finite and spherical Aristotelian cosmos did so on
purely theological grounds.38
Though Grant’s position is clearly weaker than Duhem’s, and can thus more plausibly be defended, it is
has consequently lost the punch that Duhem’s thesis carries. In fact, Grant’s thesis is comparatively
innocuous. But, it is widespread amongst contemporary scholars. Dales writes:
The most important result of the 1277 condemnations was the creation of an intellectual climate
where all sorts of imaginative hypotheses could be suggested and discussed, even if not
adopted.39
Dales’s thesis revolves specifically around the condemned propositions concerning the animation of the
heavens. Aristotle held that the heavenly bodies moved by way of some sort of “intelligence” or “soul”
rather than by a God given force or under their own mechanistic impetus. In support of his claim that the
condemnation sparked an intellectual climate, Dales points to examples of innovate thought in the
fourteenth century concerning the question of why the skies move. And again, as promised, there is ample
evidence of such thought in the primary sources. Buridan, Oresme and Henry of Hesse, among others, all
offer very anti-Aristotelian alternatives. Though it is clear that none are purely mechanistic in a
Newtonian sense, it would be unfair to expect such radical progression that quickly. There is, nonetheless,
evident progress.
However, to conclude that such progress was solely the result of 1277 is not entirely accurate, and
Dales is certainly aware of this. In 1271, Robert Kilwardby “vigorously asserted the view of the selfsufficiency of nature…and denied that God moved the heavens…or that either angels or intelligences
move the heavenly spheres.”40 Thus, there is at least one instance of a pre-1277 shift away from
Aristotelian thought and towards a more mechanistic explanation of why the heavens moved as they did.
Grant uses reasoning similar to Dales in support of his own thesis. He points to Oresme’s
Questions on De caelo, Book I, Question 19, in which Oresme concludes that “…outside the heaven there
may be a vacuum because God can create a body or a place there.” However, as was argued in section
one, it is unclear that Oresme’s remarks amount to anything more than mere musings. And like Dales,
Grant is hesitant in his assertion, writing: “In the absence of direct and obvious evidence, my response
must be tentative and suggestive.”41 Later in the text, hidden away in a footnote, Grant makes a telling
concession: “Thus even if prior to the Condemnations of 1277 views similar to Bradwardine’s had been
enunciated, it is nevertheless obvious that article 49 [of the condemnation] played a role in justifying the
38
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acceptance of an infinite extramundane void by Bradwardine and Oresme.”42 This weakens the thesis
even further. Post-1277 scholars offered nothing significantly new over pre-1277 concepts and scholarly
debates. Accordingly, the role of 1277 is reduced to securing acceptance of old ideas rather than sparking
new ideas. This hardly seems like a thesis worth supporting. The important question, however, is if post1277 scholars were basing their ideas on pre-1277 scholars. Were Bradwardine and Oresme aware of
works prior to 1277 that had posited similar views? Either way, it seems that their existence goes a long
way in weakening the strength of the claim.
Emulating the method of section one, what would one expect to find if the condemnation did
indeed lead to an “intellectual climate?” Obviously, we would expect to find evidence of debate and
discussion concerning the propositions. And as promised, this is just what we find (though there is reason
to think that this was done in jest). However, what would one not expect to find in an intellectual
atmosphere? Surely, one would not expect to find limitations placed on thought or exiled scholars. And
yet, this is also exactly what we find. The point here is to suggest that true and meaningful progress can
not occur under tenuous circumstances. Otherwise, one may question the motivation behind any relevent
progress. Scholars in fear of losing their jobs, or worse yet their lives, are apt to come to any conclusion
necessary in order to preserve their livelihood. Under such circumstances, an intellectual atmosphere
certainly takes on negative connotations.
While the fight for intellectual freedom against the condemnations of the thirteenth century was a
valiant one, it was not without cost. Careers were ruined. Scholars were imprisoned, and in at least one
case, burned. Courtenay writes, “When severe punishment was administered, as in the case of the
Amaurians in 1210, it was the clerics who were imprisoned or burned outside a gate of Paris, including
one master of arts, William of Poitiers.”43 In the wake of 1277, Giles of Rome was exiled from the
theology faculty from 1278 to 1285.44 Certainly Duhem would be hard pressed to construe such acts as
“liberating,” and it seems that Grant and Dales must accept the negative effects along with any positive
effects that may have resulted from 1277.
Further, what sort of intellectual atmosphere can come about in the face of the fear of
persecution? Wippel writes, “…the condemnation weighed heavily on the scientific life of the university
for some decades…The threat of excommunication was taken seriously, it would seem, and had grave
consequences for a master at Paris…a spirit of suspicion toward ‘philosophers’ began to replace, after that
date [1277], the spirit of friendly and confident collaboration with philosophy which had generally
prevailed…”45 And so, perhaps another generalization is appropriate: the condemnation of 1277 could not
have sparked a genuine scholastic culture.
Moreover, if an intellectual atmosphere did indeed exist, can it be said that 1277 was responsible
for sparking such an atmosphere? The thirteenth century was marked by the translation and absorption of
non-Christian philosophical and scientific works. Most importantly, this included the works of Aristotle,
ultimately leading to the condemnation of 1277. But, in light of the introduction of the rich intellectual
heritage of Greek and Arabic thought, would the decades proceeding 1277 not be considered an
intellectual climate? Further, criticism of Aristotle was already commonplace in Greek and Arabic
42
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literature. However, it was not until the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries that the works of John
Philoponus and other Greek authors were introduced in Western Europe.46 The translation of Plato, the
Atomists and the Stoics47 offered additional alternatives to Aristotle. In fact, Philoponus refutes
Aristotle’s argument for the impossibility of a void in his “Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics.” Aristotle
thought that if there were a void any motion that occurred within it would be infinite, and that he thought
to be absurd. By way of reason, however, Philoponus concludes that “…it is possible for motion to take
place through a void in finite time…”48 Had the translation and absorption of Greek and Arabic works
progressed without accusations of heresy and the excommunication of scholars, then it seems reasonable
to conclude that additional alternatives to Aristotelianism would have been at hand much earlier. Further,
such objections came out of real philosophical concerns, not theological prompting.
While Grant and Dales offer evidence in support of their respective claims, there is certainly
sufficient reason to doubt their strength. In fact, both Grant and Dales seem less than adamant in
endorsing their own theses. Further, to claim that the condemnation sparked an intellectual climate seems
absurd given the looming possibility of excommunication. Rather than leading to an intellectual climate,
it seems more reasonable to conclude that Oresme, Buridan, et alia, worked to assimilate philosophy and
theology. As Lindberg points out, “They were so successful in achieving their goal that by the sixteenth
century Aristotle had taken on the appearance of a Christian saint.”49 The conclusion of section two may
again appear to be weak. However, if there is reason to doubt that 1277 created an intellectual
atmosphere, then this is adequate for our purposes.
But if, at the least, doubt has successfully been cast on theses A and B, then it has seemingly
come at the cost of endorsing a third thesis. Scholars in the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries from, Francis Bacon to Voltaire to Condorcet, routinely criticized the church for the “dismal
state of medieval science.”50 A.D. White, has been so bold as to claim:
…The establishment of Christianity, beginning a new evolution of theology, arrested the normal
development of the physical sciences for over fifteen hundred years.51
Though White is not widely considered to be a reliable source, Russell has reasserted the “warfare” thesis,
and Lindberg holds that “…it appears to me that outside of conservative Christian circles the warfare
thesis is overwhelmingly dominant.”52 Indeed, White is far from alone. Condorcet writes, “The triumph
of Christianity was the signal for the complete decadence of philosophy and the sciences.”53
However, the arguments presented in section one are still relevant, and they conflict with C. If the
effects of 1277 were not widespread and were often ignored, it becomes difficult to place blame on the
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church. Though Aristotelianism remained entrenched until the works of Copernicus, to declare the state of
medieval science “dismal” in light of the works of Buridan, Oresme, et alia is nothing short of historical
negligence. Indeed, it is easy to exaggerate both the positive and negative effects of 1277.
Lindberg presents a devastating argument to the warfare thesis: “If, instead, we compare the
support given to the study of nature by the medieval church with the support available from any other
contemporary social institution, it will become apparent that the church was the major patron of scientific
learning…Remove the church from the picture, and there is an enormous amount of serious intellectual
activity that would not have occurred.”54 While one may demand that science be autonomous, this has
rarely, if ever, been the case. In our own culture, political, religious and economic objectives constantly
interfere with and impede scientific progress. If the church was indeed a prominent supporter of scientific
thought, then the assimilation of theological tenets is a small price to pay, even if the consequences of
failing to conform were harsh by today’s standards.
III. Final Thoughts
And so, if we can reasonably reject A, B, and C, then what are we to conclude? One author puts
the dilemma as follows:
Some commentators, however, see the condemnation of 1277 as only a minor outbreak of
hostilities which in the end produced harmony rather than discord, especially given that the
condemnation held only for a few decades at the University of Paris, while at Oxford less
restrictive measures operated, and elsewhere none at all. Still other investigators go further and
argue that by freeing medieval thinkers from the yoke of strict obedience to Aristotle, the
condemnation of 1277, in effect, liberated them to conceive new alternatives in solving longstanding problems in Aristotelian science and natural philosophy.55
While I hope to have provided sound arguments in support of the former and against the latter, I want to
refrain from making broad, sweeping generalizations. Lindberg concludes by wisely refusing to pass
judgment, either negative or positive, on the church. Where would science be if there had not been a
church? If there had been no condemnation? These are what if questions, and as such they cannot be
conclusively answered. Science does not occur within a vacuum. To separate competing religious agendas
from the progression and freedom of scientific thought is impossible. However, when the available
evidence is weighed, it is possible to determine the validity of competing theses. It is possible to conclude
that theses A, B, and C each fail to account for a significant portion of the available evidence. Tentatively,
I assert the claim that the effects of the condemnation of 1277 were narrow and largely ignored. One may
object to the project as a whole as I have outlined it, in that the arguments used to reject one thesis are
ignored or misconstrued in promoting another. Prima facie, this would appear to be problematic.
However, I hold that this is in fact a valid move. The purpose is to undermine each of the three primary
stances regarding the condemnation of 1277. If I have been able to cast doubt on each thesis on an
individual basis, showing that each faces at least one major problem given the evidence, then shifting
positions is certainly fair play.
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